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I have chosen the theme of my presentation along three considerations. Firstly, I thought 
that it would be appropriate to conclude, in some sort, the process of reflection that we 
have initiated some three years ago. On my part, I will try to remind you the main 
conclusions of my previous talks and see how these conclusions still stand today. 
Secondly, our group being interested in cultural flows and digital technology, I thought 
that the process of the World Summit on the information society would be a very 
appropriate subject, even though the very idea of an information society has to be 
closely examined and criticized. Thirdly, the specific theme of today’s conference on 
Global Counter-publics and Spheres of Power has convinced me that the examination of 
the most significant process in the involvement of civil society in the global politics is 
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1. Main conclusions from my previous talks 
 
Three years ago, at our first meeting, I have presented a talk entitled “Fragmented 
Identities and the Incorporation of Citizenship in the Midst of Cultural Flows”. My 
intention was then to situate my own research results inside the problematic of the 
cultural flows. I retained from Appaduraï the two ideas of ethnoscape and ideoscape to 
interpret the recent transformations of Canadian identity, citizenship and political 
institutions. I tried to demonstrate that, parallel to the political debate on nationhood, 
two other forces acted on the profound changes that occurred in Canadian society. On 
one part, the immigration phenomenon explained largely why it was impossible anymore 
to represent Canadian society as being dualistic. On the other part, I have shown that 
new social movements or political forces, which emerged from the sixties on, had a deep 
influence on the political process as a whole. The patriation of the Canadian constitution 
and the entrenchment of the Charter of rights and freedoms can easily be interpreted as 
the result of a complex combination of social and political struggles. As a result, I 
pretended that the Canadian identity entered a profound process of fragmentation or, if 
we want to be more positive, of diversification. I also added that the citizenship model 
developed after the Second World War was transformed from an enlarged universal 
model, putting forward the social rights, to a particularistic model, reinforc ing the 
fragmentation of identities. In a way, the particularistic citizenship is often represented 
as a citizenship of identities. I concluded my speech by saying that Canada could be 
considered as a bench work in the development of new institutional forms in relation with 
the changing ethnoscape and ideoscape at the global level. I added that the 
transformation of fundamental categories of the political modernity in Canada was 
participating in the global ideoscape associated with both the neo-liberal revolution and 
the supra-nationalisation process and that our identity and citizenship structures were 
well integrated in the new governance ideology. 
 
At the Montreal conference, organised one year and a half ago, I presented a second 
paper entitled “ Universal Movements toward Diversity¨. My reflection started from the 
proposition that existed, at the global level, a community of dissent, which represented 
itself under the label of civil society. This community interested in global politics, was 
described as being extremely diversified, regrouping all kinds of groups, networks, 
movements, views and positions, but having some kind of global identity and shared 
solidarity and intervening in the polycentric governance spaces. The fundamental 
question that I wanted to raise was the possibility that a movement based on diversity 
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and horizontality could reach universal values? My talk looked back on the question of 
the transformation of citizenship in the post-modern context. I tried to illustrate that the 
particularization of citizenship cannot be explained without understanding the role of its 
initial universal value. It is because the citizenship category is universally defined that it 
can extend in the sense of the inclusion of every category of individuals and of all types 
of rights. The result of this long historical process is not without posing certain difficulties 
in the conception of the political institutions of modernity. The “particularistic” or the 
“incorporated” citizenship that developed in Canada is certainly a model of the 
transnational citizenship that is emerging in the global sphere. Still, it poses new 
challenges concerning the design of new political institutions and the potential democratic 
participation of these new citizens. I developed in my talk, the idea that a new form of 
political institutionalisation that call itself Governance was more and more challenging the 
governmental institutions. I identified three major changes in regard to the logic of 
modern political institutions. The first is the shift in the legitimacy principle, from 
representation in the democratic system to procedure principles in the “good 
governance” model (transparency, accountability, participation,…). The second change 
concerns the redefinition of the actors taking part in the process, from citizens to 
stakeholders. The third concerns the instrumentation of civil society, which becomes a 
mixture of different kinds of actors rather than being the counterpart of the political 
sphere in the modern institutions. I was concluding by saying that three paths were 
opened for political action: reinvention of political institutions at the supra-national level, 
participation in governance and contestation. I tended to present the second option as 
mostly problematical. It is this question that I will try to examine today about the WSIS 
process. 
 
2. World Summit on Information Society and the multi-stakeholder 
partnership 
 
I won’t discuss here the problematical nature of the term Information society. It carries 
with it a bias towards a technological and market oriented representation. It also fixes a 
development aim at which no nation State should renounce. Many actors in civil society 
were very critical about such a designation and worked hard to widen the perspective in 
which the subject should be approached. The Summit was thought of as a United Nations 
Conference led by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a UN agency older 
than the United Nations itself. The choice of the ITU rather than UNESCO was also largely 
criticized because of the technical orientation of the ITU and the importance of the 
private sector in its functioning. But, paradoxically, the Summit has represented a huge 
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process that can be measured not only by the richness of the topics that were discussed 
in its meetings, but by the extension of the participation of all sorts of actors. To 
summarize, the Summit, initiated by a ITU plenipotentiary conference in 1998, has 
developed into six preparatory conferences, ten regional conferences, 27 thematic 
meetings and many other activities. 2,400 projects were realized with the Summit 
support, not to mention the two Summit Conferences held in Geneva (2003), and in 
Tunis (2005). But the most significant feature was the implication of civil society in the 
course of the Summit activities. This can be considered as an innovation in the sphere of 
international conferences and Summits. It has already gave the impetus for the 
formulation of a charter for the United Nations Multi-stakeholder Partnership Agency. 
 
The paradox is that the evaluation of the role and of the outcomes of the Summit process 
relies as much on the participation of multi-stake actors than on the substantial results. 
Multi-stakeholder partnership is constitutive of the governance approach. It can be 
represented as a triangle in which we find at the top the Nation States and the 
International Organisations, and, at the bottom, the two incarnations of civil society, the 
private sector on one side and the civic sector on the other. The States are not 
renouncing their sovereign prerogatives, but are opened to some kind of participation in 
the circulation of information, in deliberation, and in limited decision making. The 
different actors are considered as having special stakes or interests that they can put 
forward in the process. Many problems arise from this functioning. The most important is 
the incommensurability of the actors in presence. The influence and the weight of 
different actors cannot be compared. The States and the international Organizations hold 
the first role. The economic interest groups exercise their influence both as indispensable 
partners in the development of the liberal economy and as part of that undefined nebula 
called civil society. In the ITU, corporations were always part of the decision process 
along the States, but now the business community also defends its interests through the 
Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors (CCBI) created by the International 
Chamber of Commerce, which qualify as one of the partners in the multi-stakeholder 
“consensual approach”. 
 
Contrary to this unified approach, the civic sector of civil society is far more complex. As 
indicated on a page of the WSIS web site, “It includes representatives from ‘professional’ 
and grassroots NGOs, the trade union movement, community media activists, 
mainstream and traditional media interest groups, parliamentarians and local 
government officials, the scientific and academic community, educators, librarians, 
volunteers, the disability movement, youth activists, indigenous peoples, ‘think-tanks’, 
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philanthropic institutions, gender advocates and human and communication rights 
advocates”. Like one participant mentioned: “it is every body else”. It should be insisted 
upon that the views and positions of these groups are very diversified. This is not 
perceived as a problem by the movement for the precise reason that it is believed that 
there should not be any centralized political orientation, but rather a juxtaposition of 
different equally valuable approaches. It is thus surprising that the civil society 
movement have succeeded in coordinating their activities and agree upon a common 
statement at the end of each summit.1 Two features are worth mentioning as signs of 
effective participation, on a coordinated base, to the process of the Summit. A Civil 
Society Bureau (CSB) was installed to serve as a communication channel with 
governments and as a negotiating unit for determining access and speaking slots in the 
Plenary and “Content and Theme” Groups. This Bureau was more or less accepted by 
some participants, but its role was effective. Its supporters concluded that: “Ultimately, 
the CSB should receive some recognition mainly for the fact of having been the first 
experiment of this kind in the history of UN summits, that is, a formal attempt to 
legitimize multi-actor dialogues through official structures.” 2 Some other participants 
have express criticisms towards this kind of structure. CSB was considered “highly 
bureaucratized”. According to one author, “It has failed in its aim to represent civil 
society, simply because it does not include mechanisms that make it an effective body 
for the democratic participation of the citizenry.”3  
 
The other example of concrete participation of civil society in the Summit process was its 
inclusion in the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG). Article 50 of the 
Declaration of Principles of the Geneva Summit stated that: “International Internet 
governance issues should be addressed in a coordinated manner [by] a working group 
[…], in an open and inclusive process that ensures a mechanism for the full and active 
participation of governments, the private sector and civil society.”4 The participation of 
                                                 
1 "Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs", Civil Society Declaration to the World Summit on the 
Information Society WSIS Civil Society Plenary Geneva, 8 December 2003. « Much more could have been 
achieved », Civil Society Statement on the World Summit on the Information Society, 18 december 2005. 
2 Claudia Padovani, “Civil Society Organizations beyond WSIS: Roles and Potential of a ‘young’ Stakeholder”, 
Visions in Process II, The World Summit on the Information Society. Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2005. 
3 Beatriz Busaniche, “Civil society in the Carousel: Who Wins, Who Loses and Who is Forgotten by the multi-
stakeholder approach?”, Visions in Process II, The World Summit on the Information Society. Heinrich Böll 
Foundation, 2005. 
4 The article went on saying: “We ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations to set up from both 
developing and developed countries, involving relevant intergovernmental and international organizations and 
forums, to investigate and make proposals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of Internet by 2005.” 
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civil society was effective and contributed to the writing of the propositions that was 
agreed upon the day before the opening of the Tunis process. This is a rare example of 
the eventual capacity of civil society to participate in policy formation. In this case, it is 
well recognized that the input from civil society has oriented the propositions in a way 
unthinkable without their participation. The WGIG proposed, in its last summer report, 
the creation of an Internet Governance Forum (IGF), which was approved by the Tunis 
Summit. A consultation, to which all stakeholders are invited, on the convening of the 
IGF will be held in Geneva on February 16Th and 17th of this year. “The aim of the 
consultations is to develop a common understanding among all stakeholders on the 
nature and character of the IGF. The meeting will address the IGF's scope of work and 
substantive priorities as well as aspects related to its structure and functioning. It will 
also discuss the convening of the inaugural meeting including agenda and programme.”5 
The WGIG also proposed four models of internet governance, which all included mixed 
private and public structures. We know now that the Summit has preferred the status 
quo, leaving the governance of the DNS and IP addresses to ICANN (Internet Corporation 
for assigned Names and Numbers), a private organization, which depends ultimately on 
the department of trade and commerce of the USA.6 
 
3. The perception, on the part of the multi-stake actors, of their role and 
actions  
 
As I have mentioned before, the paradox resides in the fact that the evaluation of the 
actors taking part in the Summit process concerns as much the multi-stakeholder 
partnership than the substantive results coming out of the process. The evaluation from 
the private sector can be characterized by its modesty and discretion. If we look at the 
CCBI web site, we will notice that there is not much to report on. At the same time, the 
message is crystal clear and deeply consistent. The business community, in its civil 
society’s costume, is satisfied with the multi-stakeholder approach. It wants to cooperate 
within the IGF as long as it is conceived in an “issue specific” and neutral way. It strongly 
supports the status quo concerning the private Internet governance. It express some 
demands for the future: a technology neutral, competitive market place should be 
                                                                                                                                                        
Declaration of Principles, Building the Information Society: a global challenge in the new Millennium, 
December, 2003. 
5 http://www.intgovforum.org/ 
6 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, 2005, Art. 77: “The IGF would have no oversight function and 
would not replace existing arrangements, mechanisms, institutions or organisations, but would involve them and 
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preserved; a strong system of intellectual property protection should be assured; 
Governments’ operations should be transparent and operate under the rule of law; 
commitment to education and training for all, utilizing information and communication 
technologies wherever possible, should be encouraged. 
 
Things get much more complicated when we look at the civic sector of civil society. The 
most important thing to mention is the fact that civil society’s evaluation of the Summit 
relies as much on the importance of its participation to the process than on the “minor 
achievements” and “major short comings” of the process7. Not only civil society values 
the instauration of a multi-stakeholder approach, but it affirms that it is this approach 
that explains that the Summit was not limited to its technological and economic 
dimensions. Civil society is conscious of its role in bringing themes and values about the 
technological gap, the human-centred vision of the information society, the human rights 
and freedoms, the empowerment of people through the use of information technologies, 
and many other topics concerning the common good. I won’t take time to report on the 
few satisfactions and the many reservations about the achievements of the Summit on 
the part of civil society. One should refer to the document: “Much more could have been 
achieved”. I will rather concentrate on the auto-reflection of civil society on its 
participation to the Summit process. 
 
I suppose that, given the huge diversity of the movement, I could define a whole range 
of views concerning this problem. I will rather examine the two extreme positions. On 
one side, we find the ones that celebrate the achievements of civil society, on the other, 
we find the critics of multi-stakeholder partnership’s model. I would relate those two 
types of reaction to two of the three paths for political action that I defined in Montreal: 
participation in governance and contestation. Those who want to participate in the multi-
stakeholder dialogue are more appreciative of the process as a whole. At the same time, 
they are not without criticizing many aspects of the process and of its results. This 
appears as being quite surprising as long as we should expect some kind of allegiance to 
a common deed. But civil society has managed to both participate, and in some instances 
with effectiveness, and criticize at the end of the process. The declaration, at the end of 
each Summit, is typical of this attitude. It could be interpreted as if civil society was 
conscious of its limited capacities in the governance’s functioning and compensated by 
                                                                                                                                                        
take advantage of their expertise. It would be constituted as a neutral, non-duplicative and non-binding process. 
It would have no involvement in day-to-day or technical operations of the Internet.” 
7 See the Declaration of civil society at the Tunis Conference, op. cit. 
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taking back its freedom to speak on its own at the end of the process. A table in an 
article8 on the role of civil society at the Summit, enumerates the different functions of 
civil society organisations corresponding to elements of democratic practice. 
Respectively, transparency is assured by informative and monitoring functions, openness 
by inclusive participation, responsiveness by agenda setting, accountability by 
evaluation, and effectiveness by coordination. For each function, the author gives 
examples of political strategies assumed by civil society. Four such strategies can be 
used at different moments and places: education, persuasion, cooperation and 
confrontation. Examples of the confrontation approach are as follows: Statements to 
denounce shortcomings in process and output, statements to denounce failure to meet 
expectations risen by previous resolutions, Civil Society Declaration, document on non-
negotiable themes for civil society, call for commitment and demonstration of political 
will. This table leaves the space for political action wide open and it might explain why so 
different kinds of participants from civil society have been able to attain some common 
objectives in the course of the Summit.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, many actors from civil society are very critical of this 
approach. Many groups have abandoned the Summit process in the course of its 
development for the reason that they doubt that civil society could achieve anything in 
that context. In some way, the lukewarm appraisal of the Summit results comforts their 
view. Those groups have migrated to the World Social Forums (WSF) that are taking 
place at the present moment9. But most importantly, their critics of the way in which civil 
society is conceptualized remains. Civil society would be “nothing other than the sum of 
formal and legally recognized organizations.”10 People would be allowed to participate to 
the Summit process on the base of their belonging to such organizations, leading to a 
“forced incorporation”. Furthermore, many of these organizations would be more or less 
under the influence of Corporations or Governments that finance them. This kind of 
functioning would reintroduce the democratic representation model, which is deeply 
criticized by the dissent movements. Groups would become a new mediation in the 
democratic process replacing the mediation of the elected. The problem is not only who 
does the groups represent, but the very fact that the model of representation is 
reintroduced. There is no “mechanisms that make [civil society] an effective body for the 
                                                 
8 Padovani, op.cit. 
9 Communication has become a thematic axe of the WSF in Caracas: 6. Communication, culture and education: 
alternative and democratizing dynamics 
10 The following quotes are from Busaniche, op. cit. 
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democratic participation of the citizenry.” Such limitation of civil society would go against 
the diversity of the movement and would tend to bureaucratized the protestation, thus 




This brief analysis of the participation of civil society in the WSIS process shows that the 
tendencies identified in the previous conferences seem to be confirmed. The first 
tendency is the supra-nationalization process. I am not sure that it is the most 
appropriate way of naming the phenomena, which consists of inventing new forms of 
regulation at a supra national level. But we must acknowledge that the regulation of 
societies will develop in a polycentric manner. A second tendency is the particularization 
of citizenship and its incorporation in multiple identities. This phenomena is echoed in the 
global sphere through the multiplicity of groups and movements expressing their multiple 
claims. The ideology of the global movement has conformed to its own characteristics. 
Diversity and horizontality are the key words. The conscience of a global belonging and 
of a global shared solidarity is the only cement holding the movement together. The third 
tendency is the development of an alternative regime of public regulation, the 
governance model. In this context, how should the movement, which recognize itself 
under the designation of civil society, react? Two questions arise from there: is the 
citizenship model can resist to the redefinition of actors as stakeholders, and what 
alternative democratic model can be invented? Governance, on one part, offers a 
restricted model of democratic participation based on procedure, and defence of special 
interests. Protest offers never ending spaces of discussion open to all views and 
positions. But none has the capacity to respond entirely to the questions of citizenship 
and democracy. 
 
I think that none of the three paths for political action should be neglected. The example 
of the WSIS process shows that the implication of civil society has had a deep impact. 
Even if the end results are mostly unsatisfactory, the process as such and the dimensions 
that were set on the table indicate the capacity of going beyond economic interests. The 
mere fact that civil society has experimented new ways in participating in the regulation 
process at the global level and that the model has served in the conception of a new 
multi-stakeholder partnership Agency, should comfort the idea of a critical participation 
in the governance structure. At the same time, it seems to me that the shortcomings of 
the Summit show that the civil society movement must continue to develop protestation 
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from the outside, even though concrete effects are difficult to identify. The third path, 
which was not discussed here, appears to me to be the most important one. The 
limitation of the democratic process in both the governance structure and in social 
forums and the difficulty to define a global citizenship should lead us to the challenge of 
imagining political institutions at the supranational level. The flaws of the European 
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